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SEVENTEEN YEARS AGO DEL MUISE argued that the view of history which cast 
Nova Scotians as uniformly and vehemently anti-Confederate needed revision.1 
Pointing to the substantial group of voters in Nova Scotia who supported the 
Confederation option — with its implications of continental and industrial, 
rather than maritime and commercial growth — he suggested the existence of 
aspirations radically different from those commonly attributed to Maritimers of 
the Golden Age. Whereas traditional historical treatments of the wood, wind, 
and sail economy had presumed among Nova Scotians an affinity for a state 
structure which exercised only a limited jurisdiction, Muise's work made it clear 
that the option of an activist, interventionist state was not anathema to all 
colonial Nova Scotians. A revisionist interpretation of Maritime history has 
begun to appear-in the last decade, but much of this literature has been predom-
inantly concerned with the post-Confederation period. As a result, the origins of 
the developments Muise discussed have remained largely unexplored.2 
In Nova Scotia the period of Responsible Government, from 1849 to 1867, 
was one of crucial importance in the development of public policy. As Nova 
Scotian politicians recognized, accepted and explored the control they could 
now exercise over the province's economic future, priorities shifted. Of central 
importance to this shift was a change in attitudes with respect to the role the 
state should play in society. Through much of the 19th century, political rhetoric, 
both in Britain and the colonies, supported cheap, limited government. Yet in 
Nova Scotia the government made a substantial financial commitment when, in 
the early 1850s, it decided to build and operate railways at public expense. By 
doing so, it adopted a stance of economic interventionism. "The Railroad is of 
too much importance to be trusted to any individuals, not directly responsible to 
the people", the Novascotian commented in 1850. Clearly then, the "develop-
ment of our Provincial resources, and the establishment of works of public 
utility, are among the legitimate functions of the local government".3 In more 
1 D.A. Muise, "The Federal Election of 1867 in Nova Scotia: An Economic Interpretation", Nova 
Scotia Historical Society Collections, XXXVI (1968), pp. 327-49. 
2 An important exception to this generalization is Brian Tennyson, "Economic Nationalism and 
Confederation: A Case Study in Cape Breton" Acadiensis, II, 1 (Autumn 1972), pp. 39-53. 
3 Novascotian (Halifax) 23 December 1850. A direct link between railroads and the fight for 
Responsible Government was demonstrated in the same piece: "We observe that the Colonist is 
willing that the Hon. Provincial Secretary should get the money in England, by Government 
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contemporary parlance, the government had accepted the view that the state had 
a significant developmental function.4 
The transference from Britain to Nova Scotia of full control of the colony's 
finances marked the commencement of the period of Responsible Government, 
and thus the evolution of public policy is readily apparent in the colony's public 
accounts. A study of these financial documents provides a useful supplement to 
the political history of the period. Governments, after all, dole out money 
according to the priorities they establish, and spending can be expected to reflect 
more clearly than rhetoric, the value an administration attaches to any par-
ticular policy area. More importantly, public accounts, by offering a fairly 
accurate representation of the operation of the machinery of the state, may be 
used to assess the role played by the state at any particular time, and to 
illuminate the manner in which that role changed. In turn, an examination of 
this changing role should offer valuable insights into the political, economic and 
social aspirations of Nova Scotians prior to Confederation. 
Only once before has an attempt been made to sift through the financial 
records of Responsible Government in Nova Scotia. J.A. Maxwell completed a 
doctoral study of the public accounts of the province in 1927.5 Maxwell's study 
covered a broader time period than does this study, but confined itself to pub-
lished primary sources — the Journals of the Assembly, and the Statutes of 
Nova Scotia. It also focused on "representative" fiscal years, largely ignoring 
the broader context in which they occurred. As a result, Maxwell missed both 
the continuity of focus in public finance during Responsible Government and the 
interconnection between the financial and political developments of the time. 
guarantee, or otherwise, for constructing the Rail Road, but still objects to the undertaking being 
a government measure. Thank you Mr. Colonist for nothing! We presume our contemporary 
would very much like to see the money expended as in days of yore, when a few interested 
persons kindly took the matter in hand, and considerately appointing some of their relatives or 
protegees to the several offices, the whole affair went off swimmingly. Now as these individuals 
in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, know nothing whatever about the business they were called 
upon to superintend, it ceases to be a matter of surprise that each successive enterprise began in 
this city, ended in disappointment and ruin. No, no Mr. Colonist, we have had quite enough of 
the 'good old times' and the ancient system of irresponsibility". 
4 State, of course, is not synonymous with government. But if the balance between the various 
institutions of the state determines how far governmental power is circumscribed by state power, 
it is also true that the institutional complex of the Nova Scotian state was as yet fairly simple. 
During the period of Responsible Government, the bureaucracy and the judiciary, and even the 
local militia, were much more creatures of government — through the power of patronage — 
than they would later be. Government, therefore, quite closely approximated state. Nevertheless, 
it was a government initiative which caused the alteration in the state's structure and function in 
Nova Scotia, and so the mode by which this change was accomplished takes on a special 
significance. For a theoretical discussion of this question see Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature 
of the Canadian State" in Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political 
Power (Toronto, 1977), pp. 3-27. 
5 J.A. Maxwell, "A Financial History of Nova Scotia, 1848-1899", Ph.D. thesis, Harvard 
University, 1927. 
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This is illustrated by his comments on railway interest payments. Maxwell 
suggests that "as far as interest payments were concerned the government 
pursued a conservative policy, for it endeavoured to meet these entirely from 
recurrent revenue; and in only three of these years and to an amount of $230,000 
was this not done".6 Viewed from another perspective, however, these interest 
payments were the direct result of a radical policy of government intervention 
which led to a more than ten-fold rise in per capita indebtedness during the 
period of Responsible Government. 
The Nova Scotia government's railway enterprise was one of the first large 
scale efforts at state capitalism on the North American continent. Detailed 
examination of the public accounts and related financial papers reveals that rail-
roads were the major preoccupation of Nova Scotian administrations through-
out the period of Responsible Government. There were four direct results of this 
preoccupation. First, a restructuring of the capital account left both total and 
per capita indebtedness at much higher levels than had hitherto been the norm. 
Second, under the pressure of these financial obligations, the developmental 
function that the state accepted in 1854 blossomed into a more comprehensive 
directive function. Third, as public expectations of government were whetted by 
public railroads, the state's legitimacy function — that is, those activities of the 
state which served generally to ameliorate the condition of society — was ex-
panded. And fourth, government's financial management became more 
centralized and controlled. All of these conditions suggest a modern (or at least 
an incipiently modern) state structure, capable of exercising jurisdiction over an 
industral community. 
The growth in the directive function of state, which public railways were 
eventually revealed to imply, was a necessary precursor to the development of an 
industrial capitalism that consistently declined to take the laissez-faire ethic to 
heart. But while government railways predated the advent of indigenous indus-
trial capitalism in Nova Scotia, it would be misleading to assume that from the 
outset the connection between the two was widely recognized. Nova Scotia's 
railway was initially promoted as a commercial railway — one that would en-
hance the colony's trading capabilities by funnelling overland trade through her 
territory and building up population along its route. Only under the financial 
pressures railways created did the dream change from one of commercial empire 
to one of internal development led by industrialism. The unanticipated nature of 
the consequences of railway building was not unique to Nova Scotia,7 but in 
6 Maxwell, "Financial History", p. 36. 
7 John R. Kellett made this point with respect to Britain in The Impact of Railways on Victorian 
Cities (Toronto, 1969), p. 64, when he wrote that the "social and urban consequences of railway 
building...were, in a majority of cases, precipitated inadvertently by the railway entrepreneurs". 
In the same vein, W.T. Easterbrook and Hugh G. Aitken spoke of government railways built in 
the Maritime Provinces before Confederation having "given hostages to fortune": Canadian 
Economic History (Toronto, 1956), p. 250. Recently, and more to the point, Paul Craven and 
Tom Traves have alerted us to the unintended industrializing effects of railway building in 
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Nova Scotia the fact that the government itself owned and operated a railway 
encouraged the transformation of the state into an economic actor of the first 
importance. The decision to embark upon the construction and operation of 
railroads as public works radically altered, not only the condition of government 
finances, but also the role of the Nova Scotian state itself. 
From the advent of Responsible Government, and even before this time, great 
interest had been expressed in the possibility of constructing an Intercolonial 
railroad to enhance the defence and communications capabilities of the British 
North American colonies. Negotiations between the colonies respecting the 
financing of an Intercolonial eventually led to consensus in 1850, but arrange-
ments failed to materialize, as Britain withdrew her offer of a loan guarantee.8 
Nova Scotia's Reform government was unwilling, at this juncture, to lose the 
momentum toward the acquisition of that most modern of communications 
systems — railroads. They had won local autonomy; now they sought to exercise 
the powers granted to the benefit of the community. As satisfactory arrange-
ments could not be reached with either of the two consortia of British contrac-
tors who expressed an interest in the work, an explicit policy of economic inter-
ventionism was introduced. It was rationalized by the Executive Council in an 
1853 address to the Lieutenant Governor in the following terms: 
The policy of constructing railways upon the chief throughfares of the Pro-
vince as Public Works was deliberately adopted by its Legislature and 
people, from the general conviction, which still obtains, that these 
improvements cannot be secured within a reasonable period of time by 
private enterprise.9 
The state intervened not through any desire to usurp the legitimate role of 
private capital, but in order to speed the inevitable arrival of a new era of pros-
perity. Nevertheless, some scepticism with respect to the abilities (and pro-
clivities) of private capitalists was evident in the Executive Council's pointed 
comment that "those who vote the money and those who are responsible for 
their conduct, will guard the public interest quite as well as those who merely 
seek to profit from the expenditure".10 Even at this early stage, the state was 
Canada in their "Canadian Railways as Manufacturers, 1850-1880", Historical Papers/ 
Communications historiques (1983), pp. 254-81. 
8 Sandford Flemming, The Intercolonial: A Historical Sketch of the Inception, Location, Con-
struction and Completion of the Line of Railway Uniting the Inland and Atlantic Provinces of 
the Dominion, with Maps and Illustrations (Montreal, 1876), p. 53. 
9 Address to the Lieutenant Governor from the Executive Council, 14 February 1853, Vol. 236, #9, 
RG 1, Public Archives of Nova Scotia [PANS]. 
10 In the same statement the Council noted sourly their experience with the Shubenacadie Canal 
Company. In the period after 1824 that company had spent £18,000 of its own money, along with 
a £30,000 provincial grant, a £25,000 imperial grant, and £30,000 raised from British stock-
holders. The works were pushed ahead slowly. After they were badly damaged by severe winter 
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seen as an institution ideally suited to sweeping away obstacles to progress. It 
embodied society's aspirations, and thus had the potential to be an apolitical, 
though not disinterested arbiter." 
The government did attempt to bring in a railroad-building programme as an 
all-party measure; this met with less than unqualified success. In practical 
terms, the passing of enabling legislation was dependent upon its appeal to a 
particular part of the political spectrum. Nova Scotia's Reformers generally 
preferred a limited role for government, but they also cherished dreams of a 
Nova Scotian commercial empire, extending both inland and across the seas. To 
gain their support, proponents of direct government involvement in railroads 
had stressed the idea that railroads would benefit the colony's commerce. This, 
they felt, tended to legitimize government involvement in railroad construction 
and operation. Communications enterprises like railways and electric tele-
graphs, it was argued, "are distinctively the property of the whole public". As 
such, government "as the agents and guardians of the people should construct 
and regulate [them]...for the benefit of the many, and the profits resulting there-
from belong legitimately to the public treasury".12 
It was largely due to Joseph Howe's influence that Reformers accepted such 
direct government intervention. Howe, who had been one of the leaders in the 
movement for Responsible Government, was also the critical figure leading the 
Reform government to take upon itself the task of building a provincial railway 
network. He was the Provincial Secretary when the effective railway legislation 
was passed in 1853, and the following year he resigned from the Executive 
Council to take up the duties of Chief Railroad Commissioner.13 Howe's 
enthusiasm for railroads mirrored that of the British, and like the British, he 
firmly believed that railroads, economic growth, and prosperity were inextric-
ably connected. For example, in an 1851 speech, Howe, noting that the pro-
vince's population was growing by a steady 15,000 souls each year, urged that 
there was nothing to fear in assuming railway debts: 
I never see a bride going to church with orange blossoms in her bonnet, or 
a young couple strolling to Kissing Bridge of a summer evening, but I in-
voluntarily exclaim, Heaven Bless them — there go the materials to make 
the Railroads. (Loud cheers and Laughter.) So long as Love is made in 
weather in 1835 a British mortgage was foreclosed. From the perspective of provincial legis-
lators, "All this money was wasted because the Provincial government was weak enough to make 
large grants from the public chest without retaining out of the expenditure any control". 
11 This idea of the state has persisted into the 20th century. See, for example, Paul Craven, 'An 
Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911 (Toronto, 1980), p. 
87. 
12 Novascotian, 11 March 1850. 
13 J. Murray Beck, Joseph Howe: Volume II: The Briton Becomes Canadian, 1848-1873 
(Montreal, 1982), p. 72. 
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Nova Scotia, and love makes children, we shall have 50 or 60,000 added to 
our population every five or six years, who will add at least £20 or £30,000 
to our annual income.14 
While some objected to what they saw as the mortgaging of the colony's future 
for only limited returns, Howe saw debt acquisition as a tool of indispensible 
value to the colony in its attempt to develop, by building railroads, its full com-
mercial potential. 
Railway enabling legislation specified only that a trunk line cutting across the 
middle of peninsular Nova Scotia, from Halifax to the New Brunswick border, 
and two branch lines — one to Pictou, and one to Victoria Beach, Digby County 
— would be built. It was fully expected that Nova Scotia's railroads would 
"ultimately connect with lines projected through the Province [of New Bruns-
wick] to Canada and the state of Maine".15 With Halifax as one terminus of this 
far-reaching railway system, continental trade would be funnelled through Nova 
Scotian territory, to the great advantage of the colony's commercial element. 
The preamble to the railway legislation of 1853 expressed the aspirations of the 
commercial group concisely, stating that the railroad was designed to "greatly 
facilitate the internal trade of Nova Scotia, developing her resources, and open-
ing up communications with the neighbouring states and provinces".16 The 
Reform government's development strategy was thus one of commercial, 
entrepôt growth. The railroad was expected to bolster the traditional commer-
cial economy through the improvement of transportation and communication 
links and the concentration of trade. At this point, the state's developmental role 
was still seen as a limited one, for it was believed that once railroads were initi-
ated and nurtured by the state, they would generate their own internal growth 
imperative, and fairly rapidly become self-supporting.17 The financing of the 
enterprise created unexpected obstacles to the fulfillment of these objectives. 
As early as 1852, the Lieutenant Governor was advised by the Nova Scotian 
Assembly to make conditional arrangements for funding railway works, by 
14 Joseph Howe, Speech of the Hon. Joseph Howe on Intercolonial Railroads, and Colonization, 
Delivered at Halifax, Nova Scotia, May, 1851 (Halifax, 1851), p. 14. 
15 Circular — Nova Scotia Bonds (1853), Vol. 3, pp. 1458-69, MG 24 D 21 (Baring Papers), Public 
Archives of Canada [PAC]. 
16 16 Victoria Cap. 2, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1853. 
17 Howe's later remarks on the Grand Trunk illustrate his feelings toward railways generally in this 
regard: "The Grand Trunk must be made to pay, as all other Railroads in America are made to 
pay, by peopling the country through which it passes, by directing latent resources and by growth 
of internal commerce and manufacturing...as population increases the Colonial Revenues will 
increase, and as they do, all the Roads that run into or connect with the Grand Trunk will be 
pushed forward, giving to that line increased animation": Joseph Howe to Thomas Baring, 31 
December 1861, Vol. 3, pp. 1458-69, Baring Papers, PAC. 
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enlarging the Savings Bank,18 issuing more Treasury Notes,19 opening cash 
accounts with provincial and British banks, and by selling provincial bonds.20 
These methods of financing were used by the Nova Scotian government with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. 
Province Notes and Savings Bank deposits were essentially the same type of 
funding alternative. Both were repayable, but could be turned over as long as 
there were sufficient purchasers or depositors with faith in the government. 
Further, it was recognized that both were used as indicators of the state of the 
colony's financial health, and thus that they should not be irresponsibly util-
ized.21 Figure One shows clearly that these two sources of capital were most 
readily tapped during periods of railway construction (1854-1858 and 
1864-1867). 
With respect to obtaining money from banks, the government of Nova Scotia 
was even more conservative. Before railway construction commenced in 1854, 
restraint had been the watchword of government spending. While the govern-
ment routinely passed legislation allowing themselves to borrow up to £10,000 
"for the purposes of the province" they seldom exercised this right.22 Longer-
term debt was a different matter. The government made enquiries of local and 
British banks, and during the 1851 election Howe claimed that two London 
banks had agreed to act as Nova Scotia's financial agents.23 However, only the 
Bank of Nova Scotia — that same bank which Howe had so furiously de-
nounced for its monopolistic tendencies in the period leading up to Responsible 
Government24 — subsequently made a concerted effort to obtain the government 
account, and thus effective domination of the banking trade in the colony.25 
18 The Savings Bank was directly controlled by the government of Nova Scotia. Bank deposits were 
placed at the disposal of the Provincial Treasury and the government retained legislative power 
to manipulate the total amount of money which the bank was allowed to accept on deposit. The 
pertinent bills are 9 Victoria Cap. 14, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1846, and 11 Victoria Cap. 22, 
Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1848. 
19 Treasury Notes, or Province Notes as they were also called, were government issued, gold 
redeemable currency. 
20 Minute of the Executive Council, 25 August 1852, Appendix 1, pp. 4-5, Journals and Proceedings 
of the House of Assembly of the Province of Nova Scotia, 1853. 
21 For example, an 1850 memo on the subject of Treasury Notes indicated that "no obstruction 
now exists that would prevent the passage by the Colonial Legislature of a law to authorize 
[their] issue...to any amount that they deem safe", but suggested that a correlation existed, and 
presumably should continue to exist, between the population and the number of notes in circula-
tion: Memo on Treasury Notes 1850, Vol. 259, # 137, RG 1, PANS. 
22 For example: 12 Victoria Cap. 37, Statutes of Nova Scotia 1849; 13 Victoria Cap. 47, Statutes of 
Nova Scotia, 1850; 14 Victoria Cap. 11, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1851; 15 Victoria Cap. 12, 
Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1852; etc. 
23 Howe, Speech on Intercolonial Railroads and Colonization, pp. 7-8. 
24 J. Murray Beck, Joseph Howe: Volume I: Conservative Reformer, 1804-1848 (Montreal, 1982), 
p. 113. 
25 Proposal of the Bank of Nova Scotia to advance money to the Provincial Government, Vol. 455, 
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Figure One 
Provincial Indebtedness Attributable to 
Province Notes and the Savings Bank 
1850 1855 1860 1865 
Figure Two 
Government of Nova Scotia — 
Capital Account Balance 
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Figure Three 
Proportional Distribution of Indebtedness 
1850 1855 1860 1865 
Figure Four 
Current Account Revenue and 
Expenditure, 1849-1867 
Developing Nova Scotia 11 
After considering the bank's proposal, the Executive Council, not surprisingly, 
concluded that "it is obvious that this large amount cannot be borrowed within 
the province", and that it was therefore necessary "to apply to English Capital-
ists".26 Soon afterwards an agreement was struck with Baring Brothers and 
Company of London for the sale of Nova Scotian debentures on the London 
financial market. Revenue from the sale of debenture bonds was directed by law 
to be used solely for the purpose of carrying out the colony's railway pro-
gramme.27 
Baring Brothers and Company were already the London agents for the Can-
adian government, and their interest in British North American affairs made 
them a natural choice as banker to Nova Scotia.28 From the very start of negoti-
ations the Nova Scotian government had shown great concern for the relative 
merits of Canadian and Nova Scotian bonds. It is obvious that they hoped to 
enter the market that Barings had created for British North American bonds 
and become important participants in it. In 1854, Howe informed Barings that 
"as our province is prosperous, we can probably sell as many [bonds] here as 
will cover the operations of a year or two, at about the same premium that 
Canada Bonds command in London".29 Soon after the Nova Scotian govern-
ment committed itself to the agency of Baring Brothers, Howe wrote to Thomas 
Baring that he was inclined "to open public sale for what they [Nova Scotia 
bonds] will bring. The position of [Canadian] Provincial securities is wonderfully 
changed since 1850, and the difference between the two Provinces ought to be 
only a shade".30 Arrangements made to fund the economic development scheme 
for which the Nova Scotian government opted were, in fact, closely patterned 
upon those of their Canadian brethren. Government promotion of public works 
financed by British capital was the generally accepted mode of development in 
British North America. While this uniformity is surprising in light of the con-
temporary Nova Scotian rhetoric which condemned profligate Canadian spend-
ing habits, it does make more comprehensible a Confederation agreement built 
around the consolidation of colonial debts. 
Bonded debt, like all long-term public debt, was registered in the colony's 
capital account. Before bond sales were first entered into this account, in 1858, it 
# 94, RG 1, PANS, and M.B. Almon to Joseph Howe, 3 September 1852, Appendix 1, Nova 
Scotia Journals, 1853. 
26 Minute of Council, 7 June 1855, appended to a letter from Joseph Howe to Baring Brothers, 20 
June 1855, Vol. 7, pp. 246-57, MG 24 B 29 (Joseph Howe Papers), PAC. 
27 17 Victoria Cap. 2, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1854; also 18 Victoria Cap. 6, Statutes of Nova 
Scotia, 1855. 
28 For a detailed discussion of the Barings' North American activities, see Ralph W. Hidy, The 
House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work, 
1763-1861 (Cambridge, Mass., 1949). 
29 Howe to Barings, 11 May 1854, Vol. 2, pp. 809-11, Baring Papers, PAC. 
30 Howe to Baring, 15 August 1855, Vol. 2, pp. 919-20, Baring Papers, PAC. 
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had often been the proud boast of the Nova Scotian administration that a single 
year's revenue could almost cover the accumulated debts of the colony.31 Never 
again during the period of Responsible Government would this be so. Per capita 
indebtedness increased more than ten-fold during the last decade of the period. 
Figures Two and Three show clearly the dramatic, and absolute, results of the 
policy decision taken with respect to railroads. Total colonial indebtedness rose 
abruptly and steeply in response to the sale of Nova Scotian railway bonds. At 
the same time, the proportion of total indebtedness accounted for by Province 
Notes and the Savings Bank, in one year fell from 80 per cent to about 20 per 
cent of the total, while the proportion of provincial bonds leaped more than 70 
per cent. A second sale of bonds, floated to finance the Pictou Extension Rail-
way, was principally responsible for the second large increase in indebtedness in 
the final years of Responsible Government, but this bond sale did not affect the 
stability of Nova Scotia's debt formation after the 1857-1858 divide. The policy 
shift which the decision to build railways entailed was a decisive one. In one fell 
swoop, the financial structure on which the Nova Scotian state rested was 
fundamentally altered. 
In addition to the single dramatic shift in the capital account, there were two 
great shifts in the current account of the province. These are shown in Figure 
Four and Table One. Railroad construction and financing provide the bench-
marks by which the period of Responsible Government may be sectioned into 
three discernible phases for examination. In the transitional phase from 
Imperial rule to Responsible Government (1849-1853), caution was the first 
word in Nova Scotia's public policy, as colonial politicians gradually became 
accustomed to their new duties. The early railroad phase (1854-1860) saw gov-
ernment take a firm interventionist stance with its decision to build railways as 
public works. As a result of this decision, the scale upon which the state operated 
in Nova Scotia expanded. During the pre-Confederation phase (1861-1867), 
railway interest payments began to fall due, and the full impact of the govern-
ment's railway policy became visible in the current account. 
It is hardly surprising that no financial innovation was attempted in Nova 
Scotia during the early days of Responsible Government. Financial account-
ability was the greatest responsibility arising from the recent change in the 
colony's status, and colonial politicians regarded it with great seriousness. In 
any case, a belief in the desirability of government retrenchment characterized 
most of the British North American Reform Parties of this era; Nova Scotian 
reformers, both before the grant of Responsible Government, and when they 
formed its first administration, displayed an interest in both the rhetoric and the 
substance of an economical, limited state. In the assembly, for example, one 
member objected to the 1850 great road appropriations on the grounds that "the 
Legislature might be called upon to negotiate a further loan and increase the 
31 For example, Memorandum to Baring Brothers from Joseph Howe, 20 June 1855, Vol. 7, pp. 
246-57, Baring Papers, PAC. 
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debt of the Province".32 Emphasis on lean government was more comprehen-
sively demonstrated in the colony's current accounts. By 1852, prudent expen-
ditures and an improving economic climate enabled the government to redeem 
the principle and interest of the existing funded debt.33 There were also concerted 
efforts to rationalize the collection of customs duties — government's biggest 
source of current revenue. During the transitional years government operated on 
the premise that its function was to perform its established duties as cheaply as 
possible, and while doing so, to interfere as little as possible with the workings of 
the commercial economy. This approach to government was not substantially 
different from what had been the practice of Imperial authorities in Nova 
Scotia. The emphasis was on balanced budgets, free trade, and minimizing the 
cost of government operations. The transition to Responsible Government was 
thus achieved without disrupting traditional patterns of colonial public finance, 
or colonial notions of the role of the state. 
During the early railroad phase the current account reflected the major policy 
decision which had made the state a much more active agent in the development 
32 Novascotian, 25 May 1850. 
33 Reports of the Public Accounts Committee in Nova Scotia Journals, 1853. It should be noted 
that the Public Accounts for any given year are to be found in the Journals of the following year. 
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of the province. Expenditure for the transitional phase had peaked in 1852 at 
£121,395. After the railway was inaugurated, total government expenditures 
never fell below £172,648.34 Between 1853 and 1854, current account revenues 
jumped by 55.7 per cent; expenditures grew by 55 per cent.35 Although growth 
was not constant, the state now functioned at a higher plateau of revenue and 
spending. Average annual revenues between 1854 and 1860 were £201,720, com-
pared to an average of £115,755 between 1849 and 1853. Average annual expen-
ditures were £190,362 and £109,231 respectively for these two phases.36 
Predictably, railways provided the primary stimulus for the increased level of 
government spending. During the transitional phase public works had consumed 
an average of 38.7 per cent of annual government expenditures; during the early 
railway phase, the annual average spent on public works rose to 53.0 per cent of 
expenditure. There were equally significant ramifications of railway building on 
the revenue side of the ledger. During the first three years of the early railroad 
phase, the revenue category of debt incrementation and coinage rose to its 
apogee as a percentage of total government revenue, for the entire period of 
Responsible Government. The increase in this category reflected the govern-
ment's policy of funding the initial phase of railway construction by raising the 
deposit ceiling at the Savings Banks and issuing more Treasury Notes. Respond-
ing to the impact of this policy initiative, duties fell off as a percentage of gov-
ernment revenue from 80.3 per cent in 1849/53 to 68.3 per cent in 1854/60.37 In 
1854, 1855, and 1856 respectively, the Savings Bank and Treasury Notes alone 
accounted for 15.3 per cent, 25.3 per cent, and 14.8 per cent of total government 
revenues. This may be compared to the average of 1.9 per cent of total govern-
ment revenues for which the Savings Bank and Treasury Notes were responsible 
in the years 1849 through 1853.38 In all, between 1854 and 1856, some £116,000 
was obtained from the Savings Bank and Treasury Notes — a sum which 
exceeded the annual average of total government revenues between 1849 and 
34 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1853-1868. 
35 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1854-1855. 
36 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1850-1861. It is true that there was 
inflation in Europe and parts of North America during this period, but its effects in Nova Scotia 
were not such äs to cause comment in the government's financial correspondence. It might also 
be noted that expenditures on two items which could be expected to be relatively constant in 
"volume" did not show concomitant increases in "value". The cost of salaries of the officers of 
government increased a mere 0.9 per cent between 1850/53 and 1854/57; the cost of the judiciary 
by 6.5 per cent. Legislative expenses rose by 43.9 per cent during the same period, but even this 
was a far cry from the 72.3 per cent generalized increase in expenditures between the transitional 
and early railroad phases. 
37 This trend was concentrated during the years of construction on the trunk line. Between 1854 and 
1858, duties accounted for only 63.9 per cent of government revenue. Calculated from Public 
Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1850-1861. 
38 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1850-1854. 
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1853.39 This dramatically illustrates the extent to which the railroad policy deci-
sion changed the role of the state in Nova Scotia. Where previously economy 
had been of paramount concern, the government was now prepared to borrow, 
in only three years, a sum which, shortly before, would have been sufficient to 
support all of the state's functions for a full year. The desire for economy had 
been superceded by another, more pressing imperative. 
The mid-1850s was not an easy time to radically alter the nature and scope of 
the state's activities. Nova Scotia's revenues and expenditures were generally 
declining between 1855 and 1859, as the Reciprocity Treaty with the United 
States depressed the usual growth in tariff revenues and the Crimean War 
caused world-wide financial dislocation. Railway-building too produced new 
and unfamiliar policy problems. Government was not long involved with rail-
road construction before it lost the security of current account surpluses. 
Surpluses formed an important component of current revenues as "balances 
held over" in the year after they occurred, and their steady decline from 1855 
through 1858 left government with less financial manoeuverability. The fact that 
"balances held over" were the "revenue" items which, next to duties, and debt 
incrementation/coinage, were most changed during this early railroad phase 
suggests the constraints government started to feel. 
Although budgetary surpluses were still the order of the day, the govern-
ment's margin for error had been much reduced and in 1857, coincident with the 
change of government which occurred in that year, it was decided that the 
current account of Nova Scotia was burdened to its limit. The new Conservative 
administration sought an alternative source of revenue with which to meet ex-
penditures. Despite the fact that the London market was going through a period 
of contraction, they pressed Barings, who had been selling provincial debentures 
since 1856 and crediting the account of the Nova Scotia Railway, to speed up 
bond sales.40 They also went one step further. In August 1857, the Receiver 
General informed Barings that "Our Railway Commissioners are pushing for-
ward to completion the present season, the line to Windsor. This and the con-
tracts to Truro involves a heavy expenditure. I regret therefore the diminished 
sale of Bonds in July which compel me to draw in anticipation of future sales".41 
This was the first time the Nova Scotia government appeared to resort to this 
form of deficit financing. At this time it was probably already clear that the 1857 
current account surplus would be lower than it had been in the previous year, 
though it would have been hard to judge by how much.42 In this situation, the 
39 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1850-1857. 
40 For example, Stayley Brown to Baring Brothers, 21 May 1857, Vol. 18, RG 31-101, PANS. See 
also Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates, 2nd edition (New Jersey, 1977), p. 183. 
41 Stayley Brown to Baring Brothers, 13 August 1857, Vol. 18, RG 31-101, PANS. 
42 It should always be recalled when assessing the government's activities that the figures with 
which we are dealing reflect year-end totals that could be predicted during the year with even less 
accuracy than they can be today. Revenue estimimates were not of much assistance, as during 
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government, by opting to draw advances from bond sales rather than deriving 
needed cash from traditional sources of current revenues, revealed its growing 
familiarity with, and acceptance of, the possibilities of debt financing. 
Concomitant with financial uncertainty during this period was the contingent 
nature of financial policy making. This is witnessed by the criticism Howe, then 
in opposition, made in 1858: 
Come what will the credit of the Province will be maintained. All accounts 
and papers are not in but we have enough to show that if the Government 
had taken my advice, and reduced the Road vote to £30,000 and had not 
increased the School grants, they could have gone through the financial 
year without raising the ad valorem duty from 6¼ to 10 per cent. We shall 
reduce this year and let the 10 per cents stand till we know what the 
[rail]Roads pay.43 
That Nova Scotia registered a current account surplus in each year of this 
decade was a testament to the continuing caution with respect to the public 
purse and public credit demonstrated by successive governments. 
During these precarious times the first flush of enthusiasm for railroads 
passed, and there commenced in the colony a period of ambivalence about the 
direction railroad policy should take. Construction proceeded slowly as doubts 
arose as to whether the railway could fulfill the expectations of the commercial 
element. These doubts were manifested in the popular reaction to the comple-
tion of the trunk line in 1858. One contemporary noted not only that this was 
achieved "without...demonstration", but also that "[a] funeral procession would 
not have been observed more quietly".44 Accompanying this ambivalence with 
respect to railroads was the inability of either party to secure a firm majority in 
the Nova Scotian House of Assembly between 1857 and 1863. Reformers had 
retained control of the legislature till 1857, but Howe had had difficulty recon-
ciling his supporters at the extremities of the colony to the value of a railroad 
that simply cut through the middle of peninsular Nova Scotia, from Halifax to 
the New Brunswick border. Even Halifax, the primary beneficiary of the pro-
ject, proved reluctant to contribute the money the city had earlier pledged to the 
road's construction.46 Growing opposition to the finançai burden of Howe's rail-
way programme had provided one motive for the defection of Reform supporters 
the years 1855 to 1860 they underestimated actual revenue by an average of £45,718 per year, or 
almost 40 per cent. In this case, there may well have been real fears of a deficit. When the final 
figures were toted up, the 1857 surplus was £6,593, well below the £22,384 in 1856. 
43 Joseph Howe to Thomas Baring, 10 February 1858, Vol. 3, pp. 1147-52, Baring Papers, PAC. 
44 Quoted in Beck, Joseph Howe, II, p. 127. 
45 "Observations of the Attorney General on Chap. 40 of Acts 1861, 'An Act assessing the City of 
Halifax for Railroad Liabilities", Vol. 471, RG 1, PANS. 
46 Novascotian, 16 February 1857. 
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in the legislature. A government sponsored railway damages assessment bill was 
defeated during the 1856 session, and in the debate on a non-confidence motion 
early in 1857 Tupper attacked the government's inability to agree on a coherent 
financial policy.46 The pinch of an economic downturn, and concern about the 
implications of railway policy, may well have helped merchant members to de-
cide that the moment was opportune to switch their allegiance. A Tory ministry 
was formed in 1857.47 
Meanwhile, limited work was done on the provincial railway.48 This attitude, 
however, should not be mistaken for indifference. In the legislature, for ex-
ample, in Murray Beck's words, "sparks flew in abundance only on railways".49 
The Tories had initially objected to a publicly funded programme of railway 
construction because they wished to avoid any unnecessary burden on the public 
coffers,50 and until the early 1860s they attacked railway operations as inef-
ficient. During the period of ambivalence, however, they came to the conclusion 
that too much had already been invested to abandon the project. In 1856 Tupper 
had remarked in the House of Assembly that "the policy of having railroads, 
and railroads by Government, is now settled".51 Shortly after the 1857 change in 
government, the new Tory Financial Secretary, J.J. Marshall, observed that "no 
government can now let them [the railway works] stand still".52 Tory attitudes at 
this juncture are perhaps best encapsulated by the remarks of the new Attorney-
General on the subject. J.W. Johnston acknowledged that the railway policy was 
irreversible, but he felt free to attack the instigator of this policy in these sharp 
terms: "In referring to the state of affairs as passing from the hands of the late 
government, ought he [Howe] not have said something as to that heavy [rail-
road] liability? Is it nothing that we are obliged to raise a revenue to meet that? 
47 Traditionally, and no doubt accurately, the primary cause of this shift in power has been 
attributed to a religious quarrel. The Tories did not gain office because of their own strength, but 
because of disarray in Liberal ranks. See Kenneth G. Pryke, "Nova Scotia and Prince Edward 
Island Consider an Effective Upper House" Dalhousie Review, Vol. L, No. 3, (1971), p. 338. 
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the financial policies of the Liberals should not be ruled out as 
a contributing factor. 
48 The trunk line from Halifax to Windsor was officially completed in 1858, but it had been 
reported in 1857 that "the force employed [on railway building] has not been sufficient to give the 
requisite levels and stakes during the progress of the work and we consequently find at several 
places the grading of the line [inadequate]". As a result there was some spending on railroad 
construction in every year between 1858 and 1864, when the next major railway building project 
— the Pictou Extension — was started: Nova Scotia Journals, 1858, Appendix 35, p. 317, and 
Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1859-65. 
49 Beck, Joseph Howe, II, p. 122. 
50 Eldon Pringle Ray, "The Transition to Responsible Government in Nova Scotia, 1835-1864", 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1945), pp. 132-3. 
51 Charles Tupper, Speech to the House of Assembly, 3 February 1856, quoted in E.M. Saunders, 
ed., The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Charles Tupper, Bart., K.C.M.G. (Toronto, 1916), Vol. 
I, p. 50. 
52 Yarmouth Herald, 23 April 1857. 
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Is it nothing that we have to go on increasing the debt, increasing the interest 
which is payable?"53 The ambivalent stand taken by both parties with respect to 
the issue of railroads at this time reflected the close balance of power in the 
House of Assembly. Out of these doldrums, however, there emerged a signifi-
cant political debate. 
Charles Tupper, Provincial Secretary in the Tory cabinet of 1857, was still 
very much an apprentice politician when, on accepting a seat on the Nova Scotia 
Railway Board, he professed an "earnest desire for the welfare of the great work 
and a full sense of the responsibility it imposes on me".54 Tupper became 
increasingly influential, and it was under his leadership the Tories came to 
support public ownership of the colony's railroads — and their extension.55 At 
first the Railway Commission under Tupper took much the same line it had 
under Howe. In response to Britain's renewed refusal to provide financial assis-
tance to an intercolonial railway in 1858, the Commission suggested that in the 
event that they failed "to enlist the sympathy and co-operation of the Imperial 
government in completing the intercolonial railroad, in which the general 
interests of the Empire are so largely involved, Nova Scotia must turn her re-
sources to the construction of a line to Picton [sic]".56 If forced to build the ex-
tension to Pictou, Nova Scotia would exhaust her reserves, and could no longer 
be expected to participate in any intercolonial scheme. But the drift of future 
policy direction was foreshadowed, even in this expression of the government's 
limited intentions, by the unreserved support given to a Pictou Extension rail-
way. The extension was intended to gain year-round access to Pictou's coal 
resources by means of a rail connection to the ice-free winter port of Halifax. 
The support for this extension went hand in hand with the breaking of the 
General Mining Association's monopoly control over the colony's coal re-
sources, for in 1858 the Tory administration had finally succeeded in opening 
the way for locally controlled development on a grand scale.57 Coal and iron 
53 Ibid. 
54 Charles Tupper to W. Pryor, 9 May 1857, Vol. 267, # 53, RG 1, PANS. 
55 As early as 1857, a study of the railway was commissioned by the Conservative government on 
the grounds that the "interest which the public take in the road, from its being a public work, 
built on the revenues and on the credit of the province — the influence which it is confidently 
anticipated that its completion will have upon the business and prosperity, not only of the section 
of the country through which it passes, but on the whole province, — the expectation that if it is 
successful and self-sustaining that the same facilities will be extended to other sections — render 
it desirable that the fullest information, and a fair and candid statement of the facts should be 
presented": Nova Scotia Journals 1858, Appendix 35, p. 282. 
56 Delegates from Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, to Secretary of State, 26 October 
1858, enclosure 4, # 1 in Great Britain, House of Commons, Papers Relating to Railways in 
British North America (London, 1862), p. 11. 
57 Reformers had been working toward this end for some years, but the Conservatives appear to 
have been more anxious for the conclusion of an agreement, as they accepted terms which their 
opponents felt were disadvantageous: Beck, Joseph Howe, II, p. 125. 
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rails were to be the key components of a new technological era. 
It is probable that even if a general programme had been fully formed at this 
time, it would have remained unarticulated due to the insecurity of the Tories' 
political position. Tupper's stand on the question of railroads once the 1859 elec-
tion had removed him from power was more expansive. In 1860, he delivered a 
key speech, in which he brought together the problem of the colony's finances 
and the wider implications of railway policy: 
It is to be hoped that the folly of expecting any large results from local and 
isolated railways is already fully demonstrated in both Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, and that it has now become a first consideration with 
them to direct their attention to the means by which both may be relieved 
from the consequences of a large debt, [emphasis added] incurred for 
works not only unproductive of any direct remunerative results but also 
unattended by any substantial advantage to our trade or commercial im-
portance. The conviction must have forced itself on the public mind that 
we must extricate ourselves from these difficulties by obtaining connection 
with the railways of Canada and the United States.58 
Clearly, concern over the implications of debt financing was not the sole pre-
serve of Canadian politicians. Tupper advocated more railways (and an en-
hanced role for the state) as the cure-all for the problem. 
The third financial phase of Responsible Government comprises the period 
between the first payment of railway interest, and Confederation. This pre-
Confederation phase was a period of unprecedented growth in both government 
revenues and expenditures.59 It is no coincidence, however, that it commenced 
with the first deficit experienced in Nova Scotia since the advent of Responsible 
Government. In that year, customs revenues were disappointing, and railway 
interest payments burst onto the scene to take up fully 23.8 per cent of govern-
ment expenditures.60 In addition to the railway's fixed costs — escalating now 
with the onset of interest payments — operating expenses were being incurred. 
The negative balance in the 1861 current account was the harbinger of the 
heavier toll the railway would take upon government finances during this phase. 
(See Tables One and Two). 
The 1854 decision to carry out railway construction as public works had been 
both substantial and irrevocable. Railway-building had increased per capita in-
debtedness; it had also left the lion's share of public debt held outside of the 
58 Charles Tupper, "Speech delivered at the opening of the Mechanics' Institute, St. John, 1860", 
in his Recollections of Sixty Years in Canada (Toronto, 1914), pp. 34-5. 
59 Expenditures rose by an average of almost 11 per cent annually, despite the fact that both 1864 
and 1867 were fiscal years of only nine months duration. Calculated from Public Accounts in 
Nova Scotia Journals, 1862-68. 
60 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1862. 
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1. Before railway interest is specifically designated in the public accounts in 1861, it is estimated as 
total interest payments minus the amount devoted to interest payments in 1853. This method 
probably exaggerates the importance of railway interest payments before 1861, but it does not 
obscure the tremendous impact of railway debenture interest payments. 
2. These were fiscal years of only nine months duration. 
colony, rather than within it, as had previously been the case. Together, these 
factors concentrated public debate upon the value of debt financing. Tories and 
Reformers, who switched positions of power in the legislature three times 
between 1857 and 1863, began developing different assumptions about the best 
ways of raising and spending money. By the end of the period of Responsible 
Government, opposing attitudes toward debt financing had adjusted and accen-
tuated the previously existing political divisions within the colony. The time lag 
between the start of railway construction, and the definition of political group-
ings in terms of their attitude toward debt financing, is largely explained by the 
fact that the major financial burden of the government's railway policy was en-
Surplus in Railway 
Current Account Interest 




























Developing Nova Scotia 21 
dured only in the years after 1860, when bond interest payments started falling 
due. Railway interest payments alone consumed an average of 18.1 per cent of 
government expenditure during the last seven years of Responsible Govern-
ment.61 This figure was not a particularly high one in comparison to the contem-
porary Canadian (or British) situation, but it represented a quantum change in 
the structure of government financing in Nova Scotia. 
The way in which Nova Scotian administrations coped with the weight of rail-
way debt provides a useful perspective from which to observe their changing and 
diverging opinions with respect to the role of the state in Nova Scotia. Howe had 
been returned to power late in 1859, but he no longer had the influence to carry 
through his railway plans. Facing an election in 1863, he claimed that the 
Reform Party were prepared to complete the Pictou Extension within two years, 
whether or not an Intercolonial deal was struck.62 But the Reform administra-
tion of 1860-63 embarked upon no new railway schemes, and it backed away 
from promoting an activist role for the state in the colony. Reformers empha-
sized retrenchment to protect Nova Scotia's trade and commerce, for they had 
lost faith in railroads as agents of commercial growth, and feared that any 
increase in the level of the colony's debts, to fund expansion of the system, would 
place an unconscionable burden on the colony's citizens. Even Howe now 
claimed that the best policy for Nova Scotia to pursue was "to keep her own 
people at home, by making home attractive [through low tariffs], to accumulate 
wealth by domestic and foreign trade, and to pour that wealth into her own 
bosom, for her own cultivation and improvement".63 Though they were still con-
cerned about the possibility of wider communications which could enhance the 
colony's trade, Nova Scotian Reformers were more committed to limited, 
efficient government — especially in light of what they viewed as the disturbing 
proposals for British North American federation. 
Nova Scotian Conservatives, on the other hand, had by the 1860s accepted the 
industrial potential of railways. Returned to power in 1863, Tupper's administra-
tion — in sharp contrast to the Reformers — embarked eagerly on a coherent 
policy which expanded and consolidated the powers of the state. His government 
not only added to the railway system, but also seconded to the executive the sole 
power of introducing money bills into the legislature. Within this framework, 
further long-term debts were incurred in order to finance an extension of the 
provincial railway system, and public support for the colony's school system was 
legislated. So determined were the Tories on this course of action that they were 
prepared to risk the public credit with much more daring than had their prede-
cessors. 
61 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1862-1868. 
62 Joseph Howe to Edward Watkin, 30 April 1863, #52, MG 24 E 17 (Edward Watkin Papers), 
PAC. 
63 Joseph Howe, "Botheration Scheme #6", 1 February 1865, in "The 'Botheration Scheme', Nova 
Scotia and Confederation, 1865", Collected newspaper clippings, PAC (Library). 
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In absolute terms, the cost of collecting government revenues rose slowly 
through most of the pre-Confederation phase. Such, after all, was the cost of an 
expanded role for the state. Reformers, in power from 1860 to 1863, again 
demonstrated their belief that the health of the commercial economy required 
them to maintain and even improve the level of administrative efficiency within 
the customs establishment. Thus, in 1862 the government procured "additional 
rooms for the increased and increasing business of the Revenue offices and other 
departments". Concurrently, Howe informed J.H. Anderson, the Receiver 
General, that in light of the importance of the revenue office at Halifax, no ex-
pense was to be spared in maintaining and expanding it.64 In this manner, the 
Reform government attempted to compensate for the increasing demands that 
the railroad programme was placing upon their resources, while they steadfastly 
resisted Howe's pressure to build a Pictou extension.65 Reformers had returned 
to their predilection for economy in government and, in actual terms, spending 
on revenue expenses grew by an average of only 2.6 per cent annually under their 
administration. Under the Tories in 1857/59, the comparable rate had been 8.2 
per cent.66 
Furthermore, when revenue from customs and light duties fell short of 
expectations by more than $85,000 in 1861,67 as a result of market dislocation 
caused by the advent of the American Civil War, and the Reform government 
faced a current account deficit, they preferred to override their predilection for 
low tariffs rather than increase the public debt to meet expenditures. In 1862, a 
2½ per cent surtax on articles regularly taxed at 10 per cent ad valorem was 
"specifically appropriated to the liquidation of the balance of expenditure over 
revenue at the thirty-first day of December 1861".68 But this was to be a short 
term arrangement. By February 1863, Howe was able to report that "Our 
Revenue has increased bravely, down to the year's close...We have swept off the 
debt contracted last year, principle and interest. Shall strike off our 2½ per cents 
and be ready for anything".69 Nova Scotia's Reformers were obviously backing 
away from dependence on deficit financing. 
Within the category of social welfare expenditures, another important trend 
may be noted. The Conservatives, late in the period of Responsible Government, 
forced through hotly contested legislation which created a system of publicly 
supported schools.70 The current account figures show clearly that Tupper's 
administration used its power from 1864 to arrest and reverse the trend to 
64 Joseph Howe to J.H. Anderson, 29 April 1862, Vol. 159, RG 1, PANS. 
65 Beck, Joseph Howe, II, p. 134. 
66 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1858-64. 
67 Nova Scotia Journals, 1861, Appendix 27, and Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1862. 
68 Section 7, 25 Victoria Cap. 3, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1862. 
69 Joseph Howe to Edward Watkin, 5 February 1863, # 47, Watkin Papers, PAC. 
70 Tupper, Sixty Years, pp. 42-3; 28 Victoria Cap. 28, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1865. 
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declining government support for education, which had been apparent under the 
Reformers. Education expenditures during the three phases discussed here were 
14.4 per cent, 9.2 per cent, and 6.6 per cent of total government expenditures 
respectively. In the years 1864 to 1867, however, 4.1 per cent, 6.5 per cent, 8.1 
per cent, and 10.3 per cent of government spending was devoted to this 
endeavour. In real terms this represented a rise from $69,607 to $159,585.71 
Tupper saw a more powerful state, enhanced by free schools and by railroads, as 
a necessary prerequisite for industrial growth. He had a much greater interest in 
industrial than commercial development, and was complacent about the higher 
level of government expenditures implied in this type of programme. The opera-
tions of the state had grown, largely as a result of the pressure which railway 
building had placed upon it. Committed to building the Pictou Extension and 
the Windsor/Annapolis Extension, which he had promised in the 1863 election, 
Tupper felt he could no longer afford to pander to Nova Scotia's commercial 
interests, especially as they appeared to be adamantly opposed to the Con-
federation scheme on which the Tories were set. His vision of the future was thus 
sharply at loggerheads with the commercial one of the Reformers.72 
Although initially no difference had marked Tory and Reform handling of 
debt incrementation and coinage revenues,73 within the context of the financial 
pressures that railway interest payments created the Confederation option 
created new alternatives. In response to the pressures on the public purse, and 
assured that Confederation could soon lighten the financial burden carried by 
his administration, Tupper attempted a radical change in a different aspect of 
government financing. Early in June 1867, he wrote to Baring Brothers to re-
quest that they "advance to this government for general purposes [emphasis 
added] a sum not to exceed fifty thousand pounds Stirling" (about $250,000) on 
the security of the bonds they already held.74 To this query, Barings answered, 
"with great pleasure", in the affirmative.75 Never before had it been suggested 
that the proceeds of debenture sales should be pledged toward any purpose other 
than that of railway building, and Tupper admitted that "as we go into Con-
71 Calculated from Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1850-1868. 
72 For an elaboration of this argument see D.A. Muise, "Parties and Constituencies: Federal 
Elections in Nova Scotia, 1867-1896", Historical Papers/Communications historiques (1971), 
pp. 185-7. 
73 The sources of funding tapped in this category by administrations of both stripes were almost 
identical. Except for a $136,689 loan from the Bank of Nova Scotia — acquired in 1862 to deal 
with the repercussions of the deficit in the previous year's current account, and paid off in the 
same year — all the revenue in this category came from the Savings Bank ($220,500) and Trea-
sury Notes ($175,000). Debt incrementation and coinage revenue during the pre-Confederation 
phase was in fact proportionately lower than it had been in the 1854/60 accounts, though the 
absolute amount of revenue collected from this source was higher: Public Accounts in Nova 
Scotia Journals, 1862-68. 
74 Charles Tupper to Thomas Baring, 3 June 1867, Vol. 1, RG 31-119, PANS. 
75 Baring Brothers to Charles Tupper, 27 June 1867, ibid. 
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federation the first day of July next we cannot make the revenue beyond that 
date immediately available but will make arrangements to repay you the 
amount loaned during the ensuing six months".76 This represented a further step 
away from the ethic which had originally informed financial policy in Nova 
Scotia. Not only were the Tories willing to enlarge their obligations to build 
infrastructure; they were also prepared to fund current government operations 
with contingency loans. 
Douglas McCalla has recently noted the "abundant need and scope for work 
to define and, more importantly, to demonstrate empirically both the typical 
and unique features of the state's role in Canadian economic history".77 In Nova 
Scotia, railways fashioned a fundamental alteration in that role during the 
period of Responsible Government, even as they provided a basis for industrial 
development. By implementing a policy of debt-financed improvements in trans-
portation infrastructure in the 1850s, Howe's government committed the state 
to a formidable restructuring of its financial operations. 
The impact of the greatly swollen capital account had not been predicted by 
railroad boosters in Reform ranks. They had genuinely expected that the public 
debt would melt away in the face of railway revenues, rising land values, and an 
increasing population. When this happy outcome did not materialize by the late 
1850s, they were left disillusioned with the possibilities of railway development 
and anxious to back away from policies designed to enhance the power of the 
state. But railroads generated their own imperatives. Public railroads fostered 
greater public expectations of government — expectations which in turn 
encouraged greater per capita expenditure. In other words, a decision to expand 
government in one sphere encouraged expansion in others. Per capita govern-
ment expenditures, excluding railway charges and revenues, nearly doubled 
during the period of Responsible Government, from approximately $1.29 in 
1850 to $2.31 in 1861.78 Once railroad construction began, and financing was 
arranged to cover its costs, there could be no return to the limited state of earlier 
years. 
76 Charles Tupper to Baring Brothers, 3 June 1867, ibid. Much acrimonious debate arose with 
respect to this arrangement after Confederation. Barings denied any knowledge of it, and sug-
gested to Gait that he "advise more [financial] order" to the Nova Scotians. By November 1867, 
McNab — still Nova Scotia's Receiver General — had to admit that the advance would "have to 
form part of the indebtedness of the province...as Dr. Tupper's expectations 'to pay the amount 
within six months' cannot be met": Baring Brothers to James McNab, 10 October 1867, Thomas 
Baring to A.T. Gait, 17 September 1867, Vol. 1, RG 31-119, James McNab to A.T. Gait, 7 
November 1867, Vol. 18, RG 31-101, PANS. 
77 Douglas McCalla, "The State and Economic Life", Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. XVI, 
Nos. 3 & 4 (Fall-Winter 1981), p. 212. . 
78 Calculated from Memo on Treasury Notes, Vol. 259, # 137, RG 1, PANS, and Public Accounts 
in Nova Scotia Journals, 1851. Also, "Population of 1861 and 1871, compared by Electoral 
Districts within their present limits (1872), with notes of changes since 1861", in Census of 
Canada, 1870-1871, Vol. 1, Table V, and Public Accounts in Nova Scotia Journals, 1862. 
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Why did the Nova Scotian government, which held a clean financial slate in 
1849, choose the railroad option? The financial ramifications of such a policy 
were, after all, antithetical to the natural inclination Nova Scotian Reformers 
had for "restricting the type and range of government activity".79 Indeed Joseph 
Howe has been called an unnatural leader for the colony's Reform movement 
because of his commitment to railway-led development.80 His drive and political 
stature in the late 1840s and early 1850s certainly were necessary for the instiga-
tion of a policy of publicly built and operated railroads. But of course Howe was 
not alone in his aspirations. William Annand, as editor of the Novascotian, 
publicly and in the strongest possible terms, gave his support to the proposal for 
public railways. "The public interest demands the construction of this line", he 
wrote.81 Responsible government had, after all, placed protection of the public 
interest squarely in the hands of the local state. Many Reformers — riding the 
wave of support for responsibility and progress — were thus made amenable to 
the exercise of the prerogatives they had been granted, in pursuit of the type of 
progress they understood. Although Annand claimed that the "support and con-
sent of our capitalists to this provincial work is of secondary importance", the 
aspirations of the well-established Halifax merchant community did also play a 
part in the decision to build railroads. Halifax's commercial pre-eminence 
would be greatly enhanced by the possession of what they hoped would be the 
railway terminus for all of British North America. Lulled by the prosperity that 
was confidently predicted with the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty, Nova 
Scotians were easily convinced of the commercial value of railways. 
Railways went on to play an important part in the development aspirations of 
the colony. The decision to build railroads marked the close of the first phase of 
Responsible Government. After a prolonged debate, the necessity for direct 
intervention by the state to provide transportation infrastructure was conceded, 
and with it, the need for the state to carry the financial burdens of its growth 
strategy. Government committed the state to a limited developmental function 
in addition to its administrative one. As the state flexed its muscles, its tolera-
tion for the monopoly control that the British-owned General Mining Associa-
tion exercised over the colony's coal resources diminished. In turn, the breaking 
of the lease by a Conservative government in 1858 enhanced the developmental 
function of the state, and assisted its evolution into what would be a more com-
prehensive directive function. The state's legitimacy function was also boosted 
as Nova Scotians celebrated the repatriation of an important resource base. 
Henceforth, Nova Scotia's coal would be developed under public licence and in-
spection, with an eye to realizing indigenous growth potential. At the same time, 
the revenues derived from rents and royalties would become increasingly impor-
tant to the maintenance of the Nova Scotian state. 
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During the 1850s and 1860s, successive Nova Scotian administrations had to 
deal with changed policy imperatives on both the revenue and expenditure sides 
of the public accounts ledger, as reciprocity and railroads posed new and un-
familiar financial problems. Railway construction expenses incurred in the 
mid-1850s led to growing public scepticism as to the value of burdening the 
future revenues of the colony to the extent that the completion of all planned 
railroads would require. The hesitancy with which railway construction was 
pushed forward during the late 1850s and early 1860s illustrated, in concrete 
terms, the concurrent uncertainty in the political arena. These political 
doldrums proved to be an incubation period for the dichotomy that subsequently 
developed in Nova Scotian politics. In the decline of faith in railway-generated 
commercial growth were the seeds of the public debate which was ultimately 
settled only by Confederation. Tempered hopes from railways had precipitated 
the doldrums, and railways and their implications for the state were central to 
the ideological split which subsequently erupted over the future of Nova Scotia. 
According to Muise, around railroads, coal, and the idea of industrial 
progress "there emerged a group of politicians who were convinced that govern-
ment had to involve itself more directly in the economic and social life of the 
province".82 Evidently, the Conservatives as a result of their growing enthusiasm 
for an industrial future, had completely reversed their position on the relative 
merits of an activist versus a limited state.83 They acquired their "more positive 
approach to the actual use of power"84 largely as a result of the political and 
financial conditions created by publicly owned railways. The financial burden of 
state capitalism had as its inevitable concomitant centralized financial control. 
Once the industrializing potential of railways was accepted, the importance of 
consolidated financial authority was easily recognizable. It was, therefore, no 
coincidence that financial control was drawn from the assembly to the executive 
even as negotiations to finance an expansion of the provincial railway system 
took place. Tupper's Conservative administration coupled its railway expansion 
schemes with compulsory assessment in support of public education. A growing 
belief among Tories that public education was necessary to prepare the popula-
tion for the age's new imperatives, put a compulsory policy in education on the 
political agenda. Both policy initiatives were integral parts of a party pro-
gramme. Both involved an expansion of the parameters of state power, and 
acceptance of a developmental, and even a directive function for the state. 
On the other hand, Howe's vision of government-assisted commercial expan-
sion foundered on the rock of railway expenses. He, and other Reformers, 
balked at the prospect of further enlarging the state at the expense of the tax-
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payer, and they advocated retrenchment and a return to limited government. 
For the most part, they opted to retain their commercial aspirations and so 
opposed Confederation. But it had become apparent to many during the 1857-63 
period that the resources of the colony were too far committed to allow with-
drawal from the railway policy upon which the Nova Scotian government had 
embarked in 1854. James McNab provided a good illustration of this drift in 
thinking. Originally appointed Receiver General in the Reform administration 
of 1854, he was quick to applaud the deal struck with Baring Brothers, and later 
succeeded Howe as Chief Railway Commissioner. During the period of am-
bivalence with respect to railways, however, McNab switched his political 
allegiance. His expectations with respect to railways and progress remained un-
diminished — unlike Howe's — and this facilitated his resumption of the office 
of Receiver General under Tupper in 1864, in an administration determined to 
accomodate government activities to the established financial fact of railways. 
McNab obviously still believed that railways could bring financial dividends to 
the public coffers. 
It has been suggested that "the Nova Scotia of the early [eighteen] sixties 
appears to have been moving toward the political impasse which was bedevilling 
Canadian politics at the same time".85 In fact, Nova Scotians went well beyond. 
By 1864, Conservatives and Reformers could offer clearly divergent options to 
the electorate. There were, nevertheless, deep-seated similarities between the 
Canadian and Nova Scotian situations. Nova Scotia had pursued a financial 
policy comparable to that of Canada, though on the smaller scale befitting her 
smaller population. Debt-financed improvements in transportation infrastruc-
ture, facilitated by the access to British capital markets which only governments 
could provide, was a normal development route in British North America. In 
their use of this strategy, Nova Scotians, for all their nose-thumbing at spend-
thrift Canadians, appear largely to have shared their values and objectives. In 
effect, Nova Scotia travelled much the same road as her continental sister 
colony, a fact somewhat obscured by the contemporary political debate. The 
Canadian government, already deeply in debt for canals, could not afford a 
direct role in railway development, and instead encouraged private enterprise to 
act as its surrogate.86 In Nova Scotia, however, state capitalism provided the 
answer to the development problem. Because the Nova Scotian state itself had 
intervened, the political debate was more easily polarized there than it was in 
Canada. A significant group of Nova Scotian politicians, once they had been 
seduced by the possibility that the state could manipulate the speed of develop-
ment, came to the conclusion that it was within the legitimate purview of the 
state to shape the nature of the province's development. 
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In the actions of Nova Scotian governments during the period of Responsible 
Government, we may well recognize the evolution of a prototype for the Na-
tional Policy as introduced in 1878. Not only did the role of the state expand 
with its financial obligations, but the manner in which ijt did so provided a model 
for the central policy initiative of the late 19th century Canadian state. While it 
may be true that the policy-making aspect of John A. Macdonald's regime has 
been "over-dramatized",87 the same cannot be said of the Nova Scotian politi-
cians of our period. Seldom have they been attributed any ideas or aspirations 
beyond the parochial. Closer scrutiny of their pre-Confederation "nation-build-
ing" policies is necessary in order to put subsequent policy initiatives into per-
spective. Perhaps Macdonald's National Policy has been over-emphasized 
partly because the precedents for it have not been adequately recognized. 
Indeed, Nova Scotia's efforts in the area of state capitalism in the 1850s and 
1860s call into question Michael Bliss' claim that "the advent of the National 
Policy in the nineteenth century was the single most significant departure from 
the principles of free competition and free enterprise in Canadian history".88 
Instead they raise the possibility that Macdonald's National Policy involved 
only the carrying through of an established approach to the problems of eco-
nomic development in British North America. 
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